| | IT Penetration Testing | OT Penetration Testing |
|---|
| Priority | Confidentiality first | Safety and availability first |
| Typical devices | Servers, endpoints, web apps | PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, historians, SIS |
| Patching reality | Regular cycles | Systems running 10–25 years, rarely patched |
| Tolerance for scanning | High | Low — active scans can crash legacy controllers |
| Cost of downtime | Business disruption | Production loss, environmental or safety impact |
| Primary method | Active exploitation | Passive-first, evidence-led, exploitation only where proven safe |
If a provider proposes to run the same toolkit against your plant that they run against your web applications, that is the moment to end the conversation.
In IT, the worst case of an aggressive scan is a crashed server. In OT, it is a stopped production line, a tripped safety system, or a physical-safety incident. That is why most IT penetration testers should not be let near a live plant, and why so many OT environments go untested: operators are right to fear downtime. The answer is not to skip testing; it is to test the OT-aware way. We start passive, model the attack paths, and run active testing only where it is safe, in a lab, on a digital twin, or in an approved maintenance window. You get the proof an attacker could cross from IT into OT, without ever risking the process.